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The Unqualified Mess of Qualified 




In his note, Ryan Johnson drills down on the various ways that 
courts within the Second Circuit are approaching the viability of 
§ 1983 lawsuits by incarcerated individuals against supervisors
within correctional facilities. But how important is supervisory
liability in the first place? Qualified immunity allows courts, as Mr.
Johnson puts it, to “cop-out” from engaging in difficult constitutional
inquiries and instead dispose of the case by invoking the magical
words: “the law is unclear.” Over the past thirty-five years, the
Supreme Court has decided many qualified immunity cases, never
seriously signaling a desire to reconsider its qualified immunity
precedent. However, with the Supreme Court’s current trend of
overruling its prior decisions, we can hope that the Court’s flawed
qualified immunity jurisprudence is next on the chopping block.
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Ryan Johnson’s Note, Supervisors Without Supervision: Colon, 
McKenna, and the Confusing State of Supervisory Liability in the 
Second Circuit, is extremely important and topical for a host of 
reasons. He drills down on two components of an intra-circuit split, 
noting the various ways that courts within the Second Circuit are 
approaching the viability of lawsuits by incarcerated individuals 
against supervisors within correctional facilities. Mr. Johnson 
focuses, first, on the continued viability of the factors that the 
Second Circuit uses to determine when a supervisor may be liable 
for actions largely taken by subordinates after the Supreme Court 
decision in Ashcroft v. Iqbal.1 The Iqbal Court suggested that 
supervisory liability is severely limited: “[A]bsent vicarious 
liability, each Government official, his or her title 
notwithstanding, is only liable for his or her own misconduct,”2 
which calls into question whether the Second Circuit factor test is 
still good law. Second, Mr. Johnson considers a more specific intra- 
circuit split that developed prior to Iqbal, which focuses on when, 
if ever, a supervisor’s denial of an administrative grievance 
provides sufficient personal involvement to allow for supervisory 
liability. This inquiry into the nuances of Second Circuit law 
addressing suits by incarcerated individuals against supervisor in 
correctional facilities may seem like a narrow focus. But, in fact, 
Mr. Johnson’s note topic addresses far-reaching concerns. 
 
II. Supervisory Liability as a Force for Change 
The plight of incarcerated individuals within correctional 
facilities is worth scrutinizing. The limited access defendants have 
to the courts, after they have been tried or pleaded guilty, have 
 
1. 556 U.S. 662, 677 (2009); see Colon v. Coughlin, 58 F.3d 865, 873 (2d 
Cir. 1995) (listing five factors courts should consider to determine when a 
supervisor is personally involved in a constitutional violation sufficient to allow 
for liability, including: (1) direct participation in the alleged violation; (2) 
knowledge of the violation but failure to remedy it; (3) creation of a policy or 
custom that allowed the violation to occur; (4) gross negligence in supervising 
subordinates who committed the violation; and (5) deliberate indifference to the 
rights of incarcerated individuals). 
2. Iqbal, 556 U.S at 677. 
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been sentenced, and are serving out their sentences, is often 
overlooked. Justice Kennedy, recognizing the marginalized status 
of incarcerated individuals, recently explained: “Too often, 
discussion in the legal academy and among practitioners and 
policymakers concentrates simply on the adjudication of guilt or 
innocence. Too easily ignored is the question of what comes next. 
Prisoners are shut away—out of sight, out of mind.”3 
But how important is supervisory liability in the first place? 
For all of Justice Kennedy’s concern for those “ignored” and “shut 
away” in prisons,4 he is also the Justice who penned Iqbal, 
suggesting that liability should be limited only to those who act 
impermissibly and not those who oversee the wrongdoers.5 
Notwithstanding Justice Kennedy’s dismissal of supervisory 
liability claims, these suits are important, particularly for those in 
correctional facilities. Individuals who are incarcerated are 
particularly vulnerable to those in positions of power.6 There is no 
recourse, no ability for an incarcerated individual to distance him 
or herself from those inside the correctional facility. Therefore, 
providing incarcerated individuals the means by which to hold 
supervisors responsible for constitutional and federal law 
violations perpetrated by subordinates allows for an important 
level of accountability for those who occupy a role of authority 
within the correctional facility.7 The threat of suit and liability 
incentivizes behavior.8 Supervisors who face possible sanctions 
3. Davis. v. Ayala, 135 S. Ct. 2187, 2209 (2015) (Kennedy, J., concurring).
4. Id.
5. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 677 (“Absent vicarious liability, each Government
official, his or her title notwithstanding, is only liable for his or her own 
misconduct.”). 
6. See, e.g., United States v. Lambright, 320 F.3d 517, 518 (5th Cir. 2003)
(noting the vulnerable nature of incarcerated individuals because they are locked 
in cells and dependent on correctional officers for their care).  
7. See Owen v. City of Independence, 445 U.S. 622, 651 (1980) (“[Section]
1983 was intended not only to provide compensation to the victims of past abuses, 
but to serve as a deterrent against future constitutional deprivations, as well.”).  
8. The Supreme Court has explained:
The knowledge that a [defendant] will be liable for all of its injurious
conduct, whether committed in good faith or not, should create an
incentive for officials who may harbor doubts about the lawfulness of
their intended actions to err on the side of protecting citizens’
constitutional rights.
116 76 WASH. & LEE L. REV. ONLINE 113 (2020) 
will be motivated to run a correctional facility with a greater 
degree of oversight and concern for the rights of incarcerated 
individuals. So, allowing suits against supervisors, particularly in 
the prison context, has important real-world consequences.  
For this reason, the Second Circuit’s inconsistent approach to 
supervisory liability—allowing suits to proceed in some contexts 
and not others—is, as Mr. Johnson discusses, concerning. 
However, much more troubling is a secondary result from Iqbal 
stemming from the confusion surrounding supervisory liability 
suits: courts’ increased reliance on qualified immunity to dismiss 
these cases. 
III. Qualified Immunity; Precedent Worth Pitching
In order for individuals to remedy serious constitutional 
violations while incarcerated, they must, for the most part, bring 
suits under the federal civil rights statute, 42 U.S.C. § 1983. 
Section 1983 does not bestow rights on individuals but allows 
private suits against government actors for violations of some 
constitutional rights.9 Over time, the Supreme Court, in balancing 
the competing concerns that suits against government officials will 
chill conduct and prove costly on the one hand, with an individual’s 
right to be compensated for violations of constitutional rights on 
the other, has limited the reach of § 1983 claims through qualified 
immunity. 10 Qualified immunity shields government officials from 
suits for money damages if the official did not violate “clearly 
established” constitutional law.11 Accordingly, government actors 
Id. at 651–52. This rationale holds equally true for prison officials who are 
engaged in wrongful conduct as well as those overseeing them.  
9. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2018). The statute imposes liability on “every person”
who, “under color” of state law or custom, “subjects, or causes to be subjected, any 
citizen of the United States . . . to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or 
immunities secured by the Constitution and laws.” Id.  
10. See Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 816, 819 (1982) (concluding that
in order to balance “competing values” in § 1983 cases and ensure both 
“deterrence of unlawful conduct” and “compensation of victims,” only violations of 
clearly established statutory or constitutional rights are compensable). 
11. See Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 563 U.S. 731, 735 (2011) (“Qualified immunity
shields federal and state officials from money damages unless a plaintiff pleads 
facts showing (1) that the official violated a statutory or constitutional right, and 
(2) that the right was “clearly established” at the time of the challenged conduct.”)
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are not responsible for all of their unconstitutional actions, rather 
only those that violate “settled law.”12 Courts are left with the task 
of determining when a constitutional right is “clearly established.” 
This presents two significant problems. First, some courts are 
loathed to conclude that a constitutional right is clearly 
established unless the plaintiff can present precedent that is 
directly on point. “Merely proving a constitutional deprivation 
doesn’t cut it; plaintiffs must cite functionally identical precedent 
that places the legal question ‘beyond debate’ to ‘every’ reasonable 
officer.”13 Second, and more concerning, some courts refuse to 
engage in an analysis on the merits at all when there appears to be 
conflicting precedent.14 Once a court concludes that an area of law 
is not settled—as is the case with supervisory liability following 
Iqbal—then government officials are immune without further 
inquiry.15 Qualified immunity allows courts, as Mr. Johnson puts it, 
to “cop-out” from engaging in difficult constitutional inquiries and 
instead dispose of the case by invoking the magical words: “the law 
is unclear.”16  
12. Hunter v. Bryant, 502 U.S. 224, 228 (1991) (per curiam).
13. Zadeh v. Robinson, 928 F.3d 457, 479 (5th Cir. 2019) (Willett, J.,
concurring, in part, and dissenting, in part). Judge Willett expressed his “broader 
unease with the real-world functioning of modern immunity practice.” Id. In a 
scathing rebuke of the Supreme Court’s qualified immunity jurisprudence he 
concluded that “[t]o some observers, qualified immunity smacks of unqualified 
impunity,” because public officials are allowed to “duck consequences for bad 
behavior—no matter how palpably unreasonable—as long as they were 
the first to behave badly.” Id.  
14. See Gates v. Khokhar, 884 F.3d 1290, 1303 (11th Cir. 2018) (“That judges
disagree about a constitutional issue is itself evidence that a right is insufficiently 
clearly established for purposes of denying qualified immunity.”) 
15. See, e.g., Joanna C. Schwartz, How Qualified Immunity Fails, 127 YALE 
L.J. 2, 65 (2017) (noting that the Supreme Court’s qualified immunity
jurisprudence “allow[s] lower courts to grant qualified immunity without first
assessing whether a defendant violated the constitutional or statutory rights of
the plaintiff”); see also Funches v. Russo, No. 9:17-CV-1292(LEK/DJS), 2018 WL
6381058, *7 (N.D.N.Y. Dec. 6, 2018) (concluding that the “uncertainty inherent in
the continued viability” of the Second Circuit’s supervisory liability test following
Iqbal, establishes that the defendants were entitled to qualified immunity);
Mirabella v. O’Keenan, No. 15-CV-142S, 2016 WL 4678980, at *7 n.4 (W.D.N.Y.
Sept. 7, 2016) (recognizing that once a court determines that the Second Circuit’s
supervisory liability jurisprudence is unsettled “[t]his argument would, in effect,
allow qualified immunity to entirely negate supervisory liability under § 1983”).
16. Ryan E. Johnson, Note, Supervisors Without Supervision: Colon,
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Mr. Johnson is not alone in recognizing the problematic nature 
of qualified immunity. In the past couple of years, scrutiny of the 
doctrine has increased. Numerous scholars have questioned 
whether the doctrine of qualified immunity is, on the one hand, 
supported by law,17 and on the other hand, effective18. There is a 
growing concern that the current qualified immunity jurisprudence 
runs counter to historical understandings of the doctrine.19 
Moreover, one scholar’s review of qualified immunity dockets across 
the country demonstrated that the purposes of qualified 
immunity—to ensure that government actors are not deterred from 
performing official functions for fear of being sued and are not 
required to shoulder heavy financial burdens—were not 
accomplished in practice.20 
More importantly, many judges and Justices have also recently 
noted the problems inherent in qualified immunity jurisprudence. 
Interestingly, Supreme Court Justices on either side of the political 
divide have questioned whether qualified immunity, as currently 
applied, should stand. Justice Thomas recently expressed 
reservations about the viability of the Court’s qualified immunity 
doctrine in its current iteration: “The Court correctly applies our 
[qualified immunity] precedents, which no party has asked us to 
reconsider. I write separately, however, to note my growing concern 
with our qualified immunity jurisprudence.”21 Justice Thomas, an 
avowed textualist, took issue with the doctrine to the extent that 
courts are applying qualified immunity in ways that are 
McKenna, and the Confusing State of Supervisory Liability in the Second Circuit, 
77 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 457, 507 (2020). 
17. See William Baude, Is Qualified Immunity Unlawful?, 106 CALIF. L. REV. 
45, 88 (2018) (asserting that qualified immunity “lacks legal justification, and the 
Court’s justifications are unpersuasive”). 
18. See Joanna C. Schwartz, The Case Against Qualified Immunity,
93 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1797, 1799 (2018) (“Research examining contemporary 
civil rights litigation against state and local law enforcement shows that qualified 
immunity also fails to achieve its intended policy aims.”). 
19. See Baude, supra note 17, at 88 (asserting that qualified immunity “lacks
legal justification, and the Court’s justifications are unpersuasive”). 
20. See Schwartz, supra note 15, at 11 (“Yet available evidence suggests that
qualified immunity is not achieving its policy objectives; the doctrine is 
unnecessary to protect government officials from financial liability and ill suited 
to shield government officials from discovery and trial in most filed cases.”). 
21. Ziglar v. Abbasi, 137 S. Ct. 1843, 1870 (2017) (Thomas, J., concurring, in
part and in the judgment). 
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inconsistent with the types of immunity available to government 
actors in 1871, when the Civil Rights Act, and § 1983 were enacted.22 
Justice Sotomayor, too, in a dissent joined by Justice Ginsburg, 
has expressed concern with the way in which the Court applies the 
qualified immunity doctrine.23 She observed that courts, and most 
notably the Supreme Court, apply qualified immunity to inure to 
the benefit of state actors, rarely finding immunity inappropriate, 
which provides “an absolute shield” for alleged wrongdoers.24 
Justices Thomas and Sotomayor have highlighted different 
problems with qualified immunity. However, the fact that these two 
justices, who stand on opposite ends of the political spectrum, agree 
on the problematic nature of qualified immunity, suggests that this 
may be an area of the law that a majority of the Justices are willing 
to revisit.  
Over the past thirty-five years, the Supreme Court has decided 
many qualified immunity cases, never seriously signaling a desire 
to reconsider its qualified immunity precedent.25 Some scholars 
have argued that the Court remains steadfast to its qualified 
immunity jurisprudence because it is worried that significant 
upheaval to policing practices and constitutional lawsuits would  
 
result from upending extant qualified immunity law.26 However, the 
answer may be simpler than potential far-reaching fallout. The 
Supreme Court may continue to apply qualified immunity to 
government actors for the simple reason that it has done so for 
many, many years, rather than because it thinks that a change to 
the law would drastically change the behavior of police or litigants. 
The Court has held that “[o]verrulling a case always requires 
 
 22. Id. at 1870–71.  
 23. See Kisela v. Hughes, 138 S. Ct. 1148, 1162 (2018) (Sotomayor, J. 
dissenting). 
 24. Id. at 1155. 
 25. See  Baude, supra note 17, at 82 (noting that in more than thirty-five 
years, the Supreme Court has decided thirty qualified immunity cases on the 
merits without reconsidering the continued viability of the doctrine). 
 26. See Schwartz, supra note 18, at 1800 (concluding that the Supreme Court 
upholds the doctrine of qualified immunity because the “Justices fear eliminating 
or restricting qualified immunity would alter the nature and scope of policing or 
constitutional litigation in ways that would harm government officials and society 
more generally”). 
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‘special justification.’”27 Traditionally, special justification has not 
consisted of five members of the Supreme Court disagreeing with a 
prior decision.28 
But this Supreme Court, in particular, has been willing to forgo 
adherence with stare decisis. In determining whether to overrule 
prior precedent, a majority of the Court has recently concluded that 
the quality of a prior decision’s reasoning can support overruling it, 
suggesting that a disagreement with a decision may be enough to 
qualify as a “special justification.”29 And the Court has so acted. In 
the past two years, a five-member majority of the Supreme Court 
has overruled numerous of its prior decisions. In Janus v. 
AFSCME,30 the Court overruled long standing precedent regarding 
union fees; Justice Alito “recognize[d] the importance of following 
precedent unless there are strong reasons for not doing so.”31 
However, he ultimately concluded that there were “very strong 
reasons in this case.”32 More recently, in Franchise Tax Board of 
California v. Hyatt,33 a five-member majority of the Court 
overruled established precedent dealing with suits by private 
individuals against states, concluding: “Stare decisis does not 
compel continued adherence to this erroneous precedent.”34 More 
recently still, in Ramos v. Louisiana, argued during the Court’s 
October 2019 term, Justice Gorsuch voiced a willingness to 
overrule prior cases: “I can't help but wonder, well, should we 
forever ensconce an incorrect view of the [law] for perpetuity, for 
all states and all people. . . ?”35 In an opinion authored by Justice 
 
 27. Kimble v. Marvel Entertainment, LLC, 135 S. Ct. 2401, 2409–10 (2015). 
 28. See id. (noting that “an argument that we got something wrong—even a 
good argument to that effect—cannot by itself justify scrapping settled 
precedent”); see also Franchise Tax Board of California v. Hyatt, 139 S. Ct. 1485, 
1505 (2019) (Breyer, J., dissenting) (same). 
 29. See Janus v. AFSCME, 138 S. Ct. 2448, 2478 (2018) (noting that the first 
of five factors to consider before overruling prior precedent, is the quality of 
reasoning in the prior decision). 
 30. 138 S. Ct. 2448 (2018). 
 31. Id. at 2460. 
 32. Id.  
 33. 139 S. Ct. 1485 (2019). 
 34.  Id. at 1492.  
 35. Oral Argument at 51:00, Ramos v. Louisiana, 590 U.S. ___ (2020), 
https://www.oyez.org/cases/2019/18-5924. Justice Gorsuch, in Ramos, focused on 
a perceived incorrect interpretation of the Constitution. While the Court has 
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Gorsuch, the Court subsequently overruled the prior decisions 
under consideration in Ramos.36 
While this willingness to throw out prior precedent with the 
bathwater has caused some Justices concern, they have been in the 
minority. Justice Kagan, in the Janus dissent, admonished: “Rarely 
if ever has the Court overruled a decision—let alone one of this 
import—with so little regard for the usual principles of stare 
decisis.”37 In the Franchise Tax Board dissent, Justice Breyer 
prophesied that: “Today’s decision can only cause one to wonder 
which cases the Court will overrule next.” 38 We can only hope that 
if the Court continues with its current trend of overruling its prior 
decisions, it is the Court’s flawed qualified immunity 
jurisprudence, rather than some other legal doctrine, that is next 
on the chopping block. 
 
 
noted that it has a heightened responsibility to reconsider its prior jurisprudence 
that erroneously interprets the Constitution, as such decisions cannot be altered 
or amended by Congress, the Court nonetheless has recognized its power to 
overturn any of its prior precedent. See also South Dakota v. Wayfair, 138 S. Ct. 
2080, 2101 (2018) (Roberts, J., dissenting) (noting that the bar for overturning 
precedent based on statutory interpretation is “even higher in fields in which 
Congress exercises primary authority and can, if it wishes, override this Court’s 
decisions with contrary legislation.”) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
Moreover, when the Court’s prior decision is “based on a judge-made rule,” as is 
the “clearly-established” requirement under § 1983, “and is not grounded in 
anything that Congress has enacted,” the Court is more likely to correct its “own 
error.” Kimble, 135 S. Ct. at 2418 (Alito, J. dissenting). 
 36. See Ramos v. Louisiana, No. 18-5924, slip op. at 26 (U.S. Apr. 20, 2020) 
(“Every judge must learn to live with the fact he or she will make some mistakes; 
it comes with the territory. But it is something else entirely to perpetuate 
something we all know to be wrong only because we fear the consequences of being 
right.”). 
 37. Janus, 138 S. Ct. at 2501 (Kagan, J. dissenting). Justice Kagan also 
wrote a scathing dissent in Knick v. Township of Scott, 139 S. Ct. 2162 (2019), a 
case in which the majority overruled established precedent regarding the Fifth 
Amendment’s Takings Clause, noting that the decision, “transgresses all usual 
principles of stare decisis.” Knick, 139 S. Ct. at 2181 (Kagan, J., dissenting).   
 38. Franchise Tax Board of California v. Hyatt, 139 S. Ct. 1485, 1506 (2019) 
(Breyer, J. dissenting). 
